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ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to track the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic cri-
sis on EMDEs focusing on the performance of their Balance of Payments
(BOPs). EMDEs are facing simultaneous hits in their BOPs as they try to
cope with the domestic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Those impacts
call for a rethinking of some aspects of the Keynesian Approach to BOPs
while strengthening the view of international financial markets as hierarch-
ical and volatile institutions. The external impacts can be summarized in
four channels: (i) The unprecedented capital flight which has led to depre-
ciation, scarcity of hard currency, debt problems and rising spreads in
domestic currency; (ii) the fall in commodity prices, a major component of
the export basket in most EMDEs; (iii) the contraction in global aggregate
demand and supply, which together with lower commodity prices lead to
reduced export earnings; and (iv) the decrease in remittances, a major sup-
ply of hard currency in several EMDEs and Low-Income Countries (LICs).
The concomitant impact of these “storms” has limited the capabilities and
efficiency of governments to adopt fiscal and monetary stimulus packages
and to respond to the sanitary requirements. Government reactions are
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Introduction
The irruption and speed of COVID-19 pandemic transmission have affected significant virulence
EMDEs (Kohlscheen, Mojon, and Ress 2020; Pollitt et al. 2020). External transmission channels
through BOPs dominance have shown a critical incidence on output, consumption, investment,
wages, and employment (Titelman and Perez Caldentey 2015; Ocampo 2011). COVID-19 pan-
demic reveals its main consequences on these macroeconomic variables through the incidence of
trade and financial channels (BIS 2020). In the first case, the COVID-19 pandemic has seriously
affected external demand, export commodity prices, and international remittances (CEPAL 2020a;
World Bank 2020). In the second case, the global virus propagation has exerted external pressures
on capital and financial flows, international reserves, nominal exchange rates, interest rates, and
domestic spreads (Hofmann, Shim, and Shin 2020; Vernengo 2020).
Recent empirical evidence has shown that the COVID-19 pandemic has generated the worst
world economic recession since the Great Depression (Casilda Bejar 2020). It has also contributed
to create severe perturbations in international trade, provoking the fall of several international
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commodity prices (CEPAL 2020b). The COVID-19 pandemic has engendered the biggest finan-
cial capital outflows from EMDEs in history (BIS 2020). EMDEs have also suffered negative spill-
overs from the recession in developed countries. The destruction of employment and the
paralysis of economic activity reduced immigrant remittances to their home countries (Djankov
and Panizza 2020).
The surge in international uncertainty and risk spread among all countries have imposed huge
macroeconomic policy challenges (Baker et al. 2020; Seccareccia 2019). EMDEs countries face less
policy space to counteract the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (Aizenman et al. 2019),
and also display several idiosyncratic structural elements that increase their vulnerability to external
global negative macroeconomic shocks: (1) high macroeconomic volatility of their business cycles
and economic growth rates (Panigo, Chena, and Toledo 2020; Aguiar and Gopinath 2007); (2)
widespread labor market informality (ILO 2020); (3) shallow domestic financial markets (World
Bank 2016); (4) exchange rate instability (Guzman, Ocampo, and Stiglitz 2018); (5) exposure to
external capital and financial flows reversals, which are specially sensitive to exogenous push factors
(Csonto and Ivaschenko 2013; Bortz and Kaltenbrunner 2018); (6) strong dependency on commod-
ity exports and external remittances (United Nations 2020; OECD 2020; Perez Caldentey 2020);
and (7) prevalence of cyclically balanced fiscal rules and monetary inflation targeting regimes
(Seccareccia and Khan 2019; Ha, Kose, and Ohnsorge 2019; Schaechter et al. 2012).
Despite these stylized facts, EMDEs governments have adopted unusual monetary and fiscal
expansion policies to contain the incidence of global supply and demand shocks imposed through
the COVID-19 pandemic spreading (Benmelech and Tzur-Ilan 2020). Reduction in nominal inter-
est rate policies and interventions in domestic debt market are common monetary policy meas-
ures adopted in this extraordinary context (Gallagher et al. 2020). Increases in current public
spending and unconditional government cash transfers are some of the main fiscal policy actions
that EMDEs battle through the COVID-19 pandemic (Alberola et al. 2020).
The present article has two main aims. The first one is to provide a simple analytical device
with a Keynesian twist that allows us to understand some specific macro-foundations of microeco-
nomic behavior decisions in the case of institutional agents that face some of these COVID-19 pan-
demic dissemination consequences. The second aim is to analyze the main economic interactions
between governments and central banks in terms of fiscal and monetary policy coordination, and
different alternatives and limitations that EMDEs face to react countercyclically to the COVID-19
pandemic. We show that several possibilities arise according to the institutional regimes surround-
ing central bank independence and legal restrictions on central bank intervention and on the sensi-
tivity and tolerance of exchange rate fluctuations (Vernengo and Perez Caldentey 2019).
Therefore, through a simple Keynesian open economy macroeconomic model, we are capable
to kill two birds with only one stone. First, we provide a formal benchmark to study how global
virus dissemination negatively impacts several EMDEs macroeconomic variables through trade
and financial transmission channels; and we compare and confront several fiscal and monetary
policy alternatives in terms of EMDEs choices that allow us to identify four different macroeco-
nomic policy regimes.
The article structure is as follows. In Section I, we show some basic stylized facts from the eco-
nomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in EMDEs, focusing on the open economy dimension
and the subsequent policy response. In Section II, we introduce our stylized Keynesian open
economy macroeconomic model to analyze the main COVID-19 pandemic economic effects
propagation through trade and financial transmission channels in EMDEs. In Section III, we pro-
vide a theoretical classification of our four policy regimes. To achieve this aim, we use different
macroeconomic closures by combining several possibilities to coordinate countercyclical fiscal
and monetary policy actions, bearing in mind the two polar exchange rate regimes. In Section IV,
we use the main economic policy implications of our model, in the different regimes, to analyze
the variety of fiscal and monetary government support measures in EMDEs in response to
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COVID-19 pandemic. In Section V, we offer some final thoughts and examine policy economic
implications to conclude the analysis.
COVID-19 Pandemic External Impact on EMDEs
The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic has shown multiple impacts on advanced and developing
countries, not least in health and sanitary conditions. This article focuses on the open economy
dimension of these effects, looking particularly at what happened in EMDEs. In that regard, there
are some specific developments that stand out for its speed and depth. One of the most resound-
ing is the capital flight out of EMDEs and into major financial centers. The COVID-19 pandemic
capital flight episode dwarfed every other major “scare” episode in the last decades, including the
2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the 2013 Taper Tantrum (TT), and the 2015 “China scare.”
Graph 1 shows the outflow comparing with the other mentioned cases, using data of the Institute
of International Finance.
On January 21, 2020, the US announced the first case of COVID-19 pandemic on its soil, and
the World Health Organization confirmed the transmission from human to human. A month
afterwards, data shows that outflows from EMDEs cumulated to USD 4 billion. That was a quar-
ter of the capital flight observed (in a similar amount of time) during the TT, and about half of
what was observed during the GFC and the “China scare.” In the following month, outflows had
reached USD 87 billion, more than tripling the magnitudes of the GFC and the TT, and seven
times the outflows during the “China scare.” There was a USD 84 billion outflow from EMDEs
in one month. Around 71% of cumulated outflows (USD 74 billion) left equity markets, the other
29% left bond markets. Outflows stabilized after the third month (in April), afterward the Federal
Reserve injected dollar liquidity in the US, in advanced and in developing countries. On March
19th, the Federal Reserve announced the establishment of dollar swap agreements with several
central banks, including Brazil, South Korea, and Mexico. On March 31st it announced the estab-
lishment of a temporary repo facility with foreign central banks, using Treasury securities as col-
lateral for dollar borrowing.
Graph 1. Accumulated nonresident portfolio flows to EMDEs since indicated date. Source: Jonathan Fortun, Daily Capital Flows
Tracker# 2020 Institute of International Finance, Inc. All rights reserved.
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These outflows were reflected in rises on bond spreads (Arslan, Drehmann, and Hofmann
2020), and sudden exchange rate depreciations. Graph 2a,b show the evolution of exchange rates
of major EMDEs, indexed to the value of December 31, 2019. Almost all the countries in this
sample had a peak in their exchange rates in April (except Brazil, which saw a peak in May).
Latin American countries were affected more severely than Asian ones (CEPAL 2020a), who even
Graphs 2. (a,b) Exchange rate movements in selected emerging economies. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on BIS Statistical
Warehouse Data. Exchange rates reflects units of local currency per US dollar. Index 31/12/2019¼ 100.
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started to appreciate already in March. After the Federal Reserve implemented swaps agreement
and offered liquidity facilities to countries such as Brazil and Mexico, the panic started to recede.
Hofmann, Shim, and Shin (2020) show that pressure was felt not only on exchange rates but also
on borrowing costs, even denominated in local currency. One particularly aggravating factor was
the larger presence of foreign investors in the domestic currency bond market, corroborating the
thesis presented by Kaltenbrunner and Painceira (2015), Bonizzi (2017), and Gabor (2020).
The sudden increase in global liquidity preference was also felt in financialized markets, such
as commodity markets. Table 1 presents the monthly evolution of the World Bank Commodity
Price Data Index. Energy prices were most affected, but also agricultural products and metals and
minerals took a hit. In May they started to recover.
The world entered a severe recession, and that was reflected in falling exports. Countries
that relied on tourism were particularly affected, given the traveling restrictions worldwide. A
further significant impact will be felt through remittances’ flows. After reaching a peak in
2019, the World Bank estimates that remittances to LICs will fall by approximately 20% in
2020 (World Bank 2020; Sayeh and Ralph 2020). Regions that will face the largest decline are
Europe and Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia, according to expectations.
Remittances play a significant role in the BOPs and in income in many LICs and EMDEs.
According to data from the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development,
remittance flows amounted to over 10% of GDP in 31 countries during 2019, with peaks of
37% in Tonga and Haiti.1 These external impacts interacted with domestic structural condi-
tions, such as informality, urban-rural population spreads, population density, sanitary condi-
tions, health systems, and a long et cetera.
To sum up, the COVID pandemic was a big hit to EMDEs and LICs, not least from a
BOPs perspective, both from the current and the capital and financial accounts. There were
offers of partial debt payments suspensions to LICs by the World Bank and the IMF, but the
growth of debt servicing after 2012 has put many EMDEs under pressure (UNCTAD 2020).
This article proposes a Keynesian open economy macroeconomic model to include formally




The model describes an economy made of five institutional agents: Households, firms, govern-
ment, central bank, and the rest of the world. There are three things to point out about this con-
figuration. First, as will be clear below, we include two types of households: Formal and informal
ones. The former accumulate financial assets (in the form of government debt), the latter
Table 1. Index of commodity prices.
Energy Agriculture Fertilizers Metals and minerals
2019–12 76.88 83.62 72.63 77.47
2020–01 74.44 84.34 70.84 77.70
2020–02 64.96 81.25 71.03 73.02
2020–03 42.06 78.18 73.33 68.71
2020–04 29.35 76.07 73.30 65.55
2020–05 38.81 76.62 67.44 68.01
2020–06 48.34 79.78 66.80 73.68
2020–07 51.28 81.93 69.84 79.09
% Change 33.3% 2.0% 3.8% 2.1%
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data. Monthly indices based on nominal US dollars, 2010¼ 100. Updated on August
4, 2020.
1Information available at https://www.knomad.org/data/remittances.
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consume all their income. Second, we chose not to include commercial banks in the model. In
this work, we are not concerned with the links between productive units and the financial sector.
Though we understand that this sets up apart from the traditional Keynesian analysis of the mon-
etary interactions in an open economy, it would add unnecessary complications for the argu-
ments we want to make. In short, we are ruling out the analysis of liquidity, risk and solvency
issues involving the private sector during the pandemic. Third, precisely for clarifying those argu-
ments, we split the government from the central bank. Table 2 shows the transaction matrix that
records all flow transactions and changes in the stock of assets that are happening in the econ-
omy. A notation clarification: A minus sign in the change of asset holdings represents an acquisi-
tion (a purchase) of such asset, while a plus sign represents a sale of said asset.
As we mentioned above, there are two kinds of households, who receive different types of
incomes. While both receive wage income, formal workers manage to save part of their income
and accumulate financial assets, i.e., government domestic debt denominated in domestic cur-
rency, for which they receive an interest income. They are also the only type of workers who pay
taxes. Informal workers, on the other hand, receive remittances and eventually public transfers,
but we assume that they consume all their income.
Firms sell to consumers, to the government, to the rest of the world, buy intermediate
imported goods, and pay wages to both formal and informal workers.
The government buys consumption goods from firms, it also makes transfers to informal
households and pays interests on its debt to holders: Formal households, the central bank and the
rest of the world (the latter, denominated in a foreign currency). For the sake of simplicity, its
domestic debt is only denominated in domestic currency, and its external debt is only denomi-
nated in foreign currency.2 The other asset of the central bank is international reserves. The cur-
rent account, in turn, is composed of the trade balance, remittances from the rest of the world,
and interest payment on the external debt (we assume the economy is a net debtor country). The
financial account is composed of external debt flows and foreign reserves.
Production, Wages, and Prices
Firms’ production function is nested in two levels. In the first level, output is produced with a
composite labor factor and imports, with a Leontief technology. Therefore, there is no substitu-
tion between inputs and labor demand is proportional to output:
Table 2. Social accounting and financial matrix.
Households Firms Government Central Bank Rest of the world
Consumption  C þC
Public expenditure þG  G
Exports þpx :x:E px :x:E
Imports pm:m:E þpm:m:E
Wages þWL  WL
Public transfers þTRd TRd
Remittances þTRf :E TRf :E
Taxes  T þT
Int. on external debt if :Dft1E þif Dft1E
Int. on domestic debt þid:Dhdt1 id:Ddt1 þid:Dcbdt1
Changes in the stock of
External debt þDDft :E DDft :E
Domestic debt DDhdt þDDdt DDcbdt
International reserves DR þDR
Source: own elaboration.
2See the mentioned works of Bonizzi (2017), Gabor (2020), and Kaltenbrunner and Painceira (2015).
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L ¼ a  Q (1)
where a is the unit labor-requirement per unit of final output (Q).
In the second level, firms must decide which amount of labor will be composed by any of the two
varieties: Formal and informal.
L ¼ Lf þ Lu (2)
We assume that formal employment has an elasticity lower than unity with regards to the
change in total employment. The opposite holds for informal workers. We acknowledge that this
is not usually the case in EMDEs (Albertini, Poirier, and Sopraseuth 2019; Fernandez and Meza
2015). Traditionally, the informal sector acts as a buffer for employment losses in the formal sec-
tor, cushioning income losses. It is also the first step when inactive people enter the labor force
and search for a job. Informal employment is, therefore, acyclical or even countercyclical in many
EMDEs. However, COVID-19 pandemic is different. First, some of the most affected sectors in
EMDEs and LDCs are those that present high informality rate: Retail, tourism, construction, etc.
Second, informal workers are also less likely to switch to home working. Third, restrictions on
movements and public transportation during the pandemic affect disproportionally informal
workers (FAO 2020; ILO 2020). We therefore have:
Lf ¼ l0Ll1 ¼ l0ða  QÞl1 (3)
with l1 < 1: Then:
Lu ¼ L Lf ¼ a  Q l0ða  QÞl1 (4)
We assume that the nominal wage of formal workers is fixed at wf , and that nominal wages
of informal ones is a proportion of formal wages b1wf , with b1 < 1: For the sake of simplicity,
we are not adding additional equations to formalize the unemployment behavior. Implicitly, we
assume that formal sector workers, who lose their jobs, move to the informal type and potentially
can receive a compensation from government. In a nutshell, informal household contains all the
informal workers before the crisis, and all the formal and informal ones that were fired during
the COVID-19 pandemic.
EMDEs are generally price-taker small open economies when it comes to international trade.
Many of them have an export profile concentrated in primary commodities, and we will take that as
our model case. Since the 2000s, commodities have become a financial asset for investors to specu-
late (Bastourre, Carrera, and Ibarlucıa 2012), and their prices are partially explained by the liquidity
conditions and risk perceptions in global financial markets, at least in the short-run (Carrera 2018).
In this vein, we model the export price in domestic currency as the product of international
price times the nominal exchange rate times a global risk factor. Equation (5) captures the argu-
ment:
px ¼ E  pwx  1 f  riskð Þ (5)
where px is the export price in domestic currency, pwx is the commodity price quoted in inter-
national markets, E is the nominal exchange rate (defined as unit of local currency per unit of
foreign currency; an increase means a nominal exchange rate depreciation), and f is an exogen-
ous positive parameter, which shows the sensitivity of commodity prices to changes in global risk
perceptions. Tight liquidity conditions and higher uncertainty in international financial markets
lead to a fall in commodity prices. Import prices are exogenous and determined in international
markets. When translated into domestic currency value, the equation is as follows:
pm ¼ E  pwm (6)
with pwm the price determined in international markets. This means that domestic conditions of
competitiveness captured by the real exchange rate do not impact the performance of export
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and import volumes, at least in the short run. This is compatible with the “dominant currency
paradigm” of Gopinath (2016) and Adler et al. (2020): Imports and exports are denominated in
US dollars and, in the case of commodity exporters, their price is determined in exter-
nal markets.
Along with tradable goods, the economy produces non-tradable products with labor and imported
inputs. Prices of non-tradable goods are set with a fixed markup over wages and imports:
pNT ¼ 1þ pð Þ:ða W þ am  pmÞ (7)
where p is the exogenous markup rate, W is the wage bill, and am represents the unit require-
ment of imports per unit final output.
Trade volumes are a function of domestic and external demand, as captured in Equations (8)
and (9):
x ¼ hx  Qxf (8)
m ¼ am  Q (9)
where Qf refers to foreign real GDP, x is a positive exogenous parameter that captures income
elasticity of exports. In case of some EMDEs that export primary agricultural products, export
prices also influence the consumption basket. Therefore, we model the price deflator as a




pbii 8 i ¼ x; nt (10)
where b is the share of i in the consumption bundle.





Income Expenditure and Balances
Total nominal income of formal workers is:
Yf ¼ wf  Lf þ id:Dhdt1 (12)
While total nominal income of informal ones is:
Yu ¼ wu  Lu þ TRd þ TRf :E (13)
Formal workers consume a portion c of their income after taxes and save the rest, investing in
domestic public debt (DDhdt ). This saving rate rises with real depreciations (Gala and Rocha 2009;
Frenkel and Rapetti 2015).3 Informal workers consume all their income. Making use of
Equations (3), (4), (12), and (13), nominal consumption is:
C ¼ c 1 sð Þ ðwf  ðl0 a  Qð Þl1 þ id:Dhdt1
h i
þ b1wf a  Q l0 a  Qð Þl1
 þ TRd þ TRf :E (14)
In what follows, we present the government balance and the external balance. Starting by the
former, we can count as expenditure the government spending on goods (G), transfers to
3There exists some empirical evidence that proves that saving rates show a growing up tendency during the COVID-19
pandemic (Tiftik and Della Guardia 2020). Theoretical economic intuition frequently suggests that saving rates increase when
fundamental uncertainty prevails, as seems to be the case of the COVID-19 pandemic at a global dimension, particularly in
the case of EMDEs (OECD Economic Outlook 2020; Djankov and Panizza 2020). This increase in the households’ savings
precautionary motive is also explained by the fall in the private expenditures on final goods and services due to different
lockdowns applied by public authorities (Lavoie 2020).
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informal workers/households (TRd) and interest payments on internal (id:Ddt1) and external pub-
lic debt (if :D
f
t1E). Its current revenues come only from tax collection (T). Therefore, the fiscal
deficit must be financed by domestic (DDdt ) or external public debt (DD
f
t :E). Whatever domestic
debt is left after households purchase public bonds, is acquired by the central bank. Nevertheless,
one of the closures we will examine is when this possibility (“monetization of public deficit”) is
forbidden by law and/or restricted by commitments with IMF programs.4 Interest rates are set
exogenously, domestic interest rate by the central bank, external interest rate by international
markets. Government balance is, therefore:
Gþ TRd þ id:Ddt1 þ if :Dft1:E T ¼ DDdt þ DDft :E (15)
It is time to present the equation describing the BOPs. The current account is composed of
exports and imports, remittances, and interest payments. The financial account registers external
debt flows and international reserves. Making use of Equations (5), (6), (8), and (9), we depict
the balance of payments, expressed in domestic currency, as:




 E  pwm
 
am  Qð Þ þ TRf :E if :Dft1E ¼ þ DR  DDft :E
(16)
One final item to introduce at this stage refers to external public debt. We assume that this
variable is totally determined by exogenous external risk global perceptions, in line with Global
Financial Cycle literature main contributions (Aldasoro et al. 2020; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey
Table 4. Policy reaction and impacts in different regimes.
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4
B.B. (15) BOPs (16) B.B. (15) BOPs (16) B.B. (15) BOPs (16) B.B. (15) BOPs (16)
G þ  þ –
TRd þ  þ 
id:Ddt1 ¼ ¼ ¼ ¼
if :Dft1:E ¼ ¼ þ þ
T    
DDhdt    
DDcbdt þ 0 þ 0
DDft        
DE 0 0 þ þ
E  pwx  1 f  riskð Þ
    ? 
hx  Qxf    
E  pwm ? ? ? ?
am  Q    
TRf :E   ? ?
if :Dft1E ¼ ¼ þ þ
DR   0 0
DDft :E   ? ?
Government expenditure falls until variations in reserves are null.
Source: own elaboration. B.B. expresses governments budget balances.
Table 3. Alternative policy regimes.
Fixed nominal exchange rate (ER)
regime (DR 6¼ 0Þ
Flexible nominal exchange rate
(ER) regime (DR ¼ 0Þ
BIS/MMT (DDcbdt 6¼ 0Þ 1 3
IMF (DDcbdt ¼ 0Þ 2 4
Source: own elaboration.
4Given that the model does not include a banking system, we have not included reflux mechanisms. Though a considerable
omission, this does not affect the main results of this article.
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2020; Kregel 2014). When conditions in international financial markets deteriorate, there is a
lower appetite for risk/debt of EMDEs, and the opposite holds when global liquidity conditions
ease. This may be reflected in prices (sovereign spreads, exchange rates) and quantities (flow of
debt). Though interest rates are fixed, we will explore changes in exchange rates and financing
alternatives (debt flows). At this stage, we just highlight that external debt financing is negatively
related to global risk:
DDft ¼ f riskð Þ; with f 0 :ð Þ < 0 (17)
Closures
Variety of Closures and Regimes
As mentioned in the Introduction, the financial panic associated with the COVID-19 pandemic
led to sudden, massive, and unprecedented financial outflows from EMDEs, in a truly short span
of time. When entering the pandemic, these economies had different institutional and socioeco-
nomic contexts. There are a few settings and norms that interest us in this article because they
mold the policy space and the policy response to the sudden and abrupt recession that engulfed
most countries.
Many EMDEs have adopted inflation targeting monetary regimes, prioritizing inflation control
as the main (and in some cases only) aim of the central bank. This monetary policy regime
included the outright prohibition of monetary financing of the public deficit. Furthermore, this is
part and parcel of IMF conditional programs. Governments had to rely on market conditions for
their financing, and the central bank was forbidden from intervening in domestic debt markets.
Alternative views are associated with Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and Post Keynesian
approaches,5 for instance. But recently, even the BIS has come forward in favor of central bank
intervention in local currency (public) debt markets to attenuate instability, particularly in the
context of high participation of foreign investors (Hofmann, Shim, and Shin 2020; Arslan,
Drehmann, and Hofmann 2020). Woodford (2020) and Guerrieri et al. (2020) acknowledge the
importance of fiscal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic, even in the context of IT monetary
regimes, recognizing the limits of monetary policy in this context. Consequently, our two oppos-
ing closures will be one in which the central bank can acquire public debt, and one in which it is
forbidden, and holdings of public debt do not change.
The main instrument to conduct monetary policy in inflation targeting regimes is the short-
run nominal policy interest rate. Initial proposals for inflation targeting seemed to disregard the
use of the exchange rate as an explicit instrument, policy tool or objective with an inflation tar-
geting monetary regime (Clarida, Galı, and Gertler 1999). However, and unlike in advanced
economies, the exchange rate has a significant importance in the dynamics of inflation, even
though the pass-through decreased in recent decades (Cherkasky and Abeles 2019; Ha, Kose, and
Ohnsorge 2019; Carriere-Swallow et al. 2016; Goldberg and Campa 2010). The importance of
exchange rate stability for the practice of monetary policy in EMDEs has, however, been recog-
nized theoretically (Ostry, Ghosh, and Chamon 2016) and in practice, if one observes changes in
international reserves, for instance. In this article, we take fixed and flexible nominal exchange
rate as two corner solutions regimes, though we acknowledge that interventions in the foreign
exchange market and the pursuit of exchange rate stability vary from country to country. A flex-
ible exchange rate regime implies that reserves are unchanged from period to period.
With two polar cases for exchange rate policy and two polar cases for central bank interven-
tion in domestic public debt markets, we have four alternative policy regimes. The policy space
5See the contributions of Lavoie (2013), Fullwiler (2020), and Tymoigne (2020).
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for implementing a stimulus package through fiscal policy will vary according to each of these
regimes. Table 3 sums up the four possibilities.
The situation in which we analyze these regimes is one in which global risk perceptions have
tightened, global demand has fallen, and remittances have decreased, in line with the empirical
stylized facts that we show in Section “COVID-19 Pandemic External Impact on EMDEs.” The
impact on domestic conditions comes through a variety of transmission mechanisms.:
A. Domestic production drops on account of falling external demand, and lower consumption
by informal workers. These social actors see their income (remittances) and employment
reduced, in a larger proportion than formal workers.
B. External situation deteriorates. Imports fall, but so do exports, both on price (because of
lower commodity prices) and quantities (due to lower external demand). Together with the
fall in remittances, there is an increase in current account deficit, even in the eventual case
that the trade balance remains in equilibrium.
C. Government sees an increase in its budget deficit, because of the fall in tax revenues and the
concurrent increase in its expenditures. The monetary policy regime will allow or constrain
the policy space to counteract the recession.
The regimes in Table 4 are theoretical, extreme policy ones. Experience has shown a mix of
responses, including some that we excluded by assumption, such as rising interest rates.
The narrative of the impact on the main variables and the policy reaction according to each of
these regimes, in our relatively simple model, is as follows. Table 4 sums up the different effects
according to each regime.
Regime 1: Because of a fixed ER regime, with a current account deficit and with capital out-
flows, international reserves are falling. Equally, while the domestic private saving rate is rising,
private aggregate savings are falling due to lower domestic output and falling household incomes,
while the government must counteract the recession and mounting unemployment. In this con-
text, government expenditure (through public spending on goods and transfers to informal work-
ers) rises to counteract falling private expenditure, in order to try to stabilize effective demand.
However, the impact on savings rates and income inequality is different according to the type of
public expenditure. Transfers to informal workers are consumed entirely increasing aggregate
demand. Their effect on tax revenues is only indirect (by increased economic activity and reten-
tion of formal workers), and the same holds for private savings. It is interesting to notice that, in
this case, household income falls by much less than domestic production because of government
transfers. Public purchasing of goods, or policies designed to support employment in the formal
sector, have higher leakages on taxes and savings (because of larger formal workers’ income).
Accommodating demand of public bonds by the central bank fills the financing gap, while
reserves fall covering the BOPs deficit. This situation can go on if international reserves remain
at a sufficient level. Decomposing domestic debt into its private and public (central bank) holders,
we look at the government budget Equation (15) and the BOPs Equation (16). With the men-
tioned nuances about the effects of different types of government expenditure, Table 6 sums up
the effects in terms of variables involved.
Regime 2: In this case, the central bank is forbidden from purchasing government debt, which
must reduce its spending to prevent a budget deficit. Furthermore, if the aim is to defend the
fixed nominal ER (or address some degree of stability in the exchange rate market), fiscal policy
is the only policy instrument at hand to attenuate the fall in international reserves by sinking
imports. In this sense, public expenditure becomes endogenous, and an inverse function of global
risk perceptions, until reserves reach a stable position. Experience tells, however, that a successful
reduction in fiscal deficits takes time, particularly if attempted through expenditure cuts (Ciccone
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2013). With a limited, or even zero, amount of government transfers delivered to the informal
sector, we should face a rapid increase in poverty and income inequality.
Regime 3: The tightening of global risk perceptions and liquidity conditions will cause a nom-
inal ER depreciation, with several offsetting effects. On the one hand, while commodity prices in
external markets will fall, the depreciation will increase the domestic price of foreign goods. It
will also lead to a reduction in real wages and an increase in the private saving rate and com-
pounding the fall in domestic demand (recall that the saving propensity of the formal sector is
inversely related to the exchange rates).6 Remittances for informal workers will fall, but then
again, their domestic value will not fall as much due to the nominal ER depreciation. The
increase in savings and the possibilities of the central bank to finance the government provides a
secure market for government debt. The government has the domestic resources to implement a
fiscal stimulus, and the fall in domestic demand is (at least partially) offset by government spend-
ing, so that imports do not fall by much. Barring government transfers to the informal sector, the
only dampening to increased income inequality is the higher domestic value (due to nominal ER
depreciation) of foreign remittances (which are nonetheless falling). Therefore, there are falling
exports, falling remittances and larger capital outflows, on a magnitude greater than the fall in
imports. This scenario is intrinsically unstable because it lacks an explicit anchor, other than an
improvement in global risk perceptions conditions. The nominal ER will increase (depreciate) if
external conditions are unfavorable, because no other element of the BOPs adjusts the emerging
disequilibrium. And just as fiscal austerity may take time to reduce the budget deficit (if at all),
the fall in the ER must be substantial to reduce imports and stabilize the foreign exchange mar-
ket. But potentially fiscal expenditure may act against this reduction in imports. The only viable
anchor is an improvement in global conditions that stabilize the exchange rate via dampening
capital outflows. As will be mentioned in the next section, this was one of the effects of the inter-
vention of the Federal Reserve in international capital markets.
Regime 4: The nominal ER depreciation due to capital outflows pressures will add a recession-
ary element to domestic conditions on top of falling external demand, as mentioned in the previ-
ous regime. In this case, however, the government is prevented from increasing its expenditure to
stimulate the economy, and it must reduce it. The fall in domestic demand will be faster and
deeper, and imports will contract. As in the previous case, the only dampening impact on
inequality is that the domestic currency value of remittances does not fall as much and may even
increase, though in the context of rising inflation. The nominal ER will increase (depreciate) if
external financial conditions deteriorate and will only stabilize if external conditions improve.
Core Macroeconomic Model Features and Governments Responses to COVID-19 Pandemic
Governments responded in different manners to COVID-19 pandemic challenges. Following the
schematic presentation in our model, in terms of fiscal policy one can regroup the response in terms
of measures supporting household incomes, and measures supporting firms. The latter aimed at pre-
serving employment and preventing generalized bankruptcies, while the former cushioned incomes of
vulnerable households. Formal workers were the main beneficiaries of programs for firm support,
while informal ones were the target of income support through cash transfers. Many countries imple-
mented both types of measures. Table 5 reproduces a list presented in the BIS Annual Economic
Report (BIS 2020), mentioning different types of measures in a selected group of EMDEs.
This table summarizes fiscal packages that have been announced at the national level in
response to COVID-19 pandemic.
6Nominal ER devaluations imply a transfer of income from wage-earners to firms, either through rising imported input costs,
or through higher prices of tradable goods.
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Nevertheless, the average size of fiscal packages in EMDEs was less than half the packages in
advanced economies. Their size was negatively correlated with the pre-crisis sovereign yield, sov-
ereign debt ratings, and with the change in credit default swaps spreads during the COVID-19
pandemic (Alberola et al. 2020). The external conditions weighted heavily in the fiscal space that
countries had when dealing with the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In terms of monetary policy measures, many countries were bounded by their institutional frame-
work and monetary policy regime. For instance, inflation targeting regimes preclude the financial
assistance from central banks to the Treasuries. However, at times of stress such as during the pan-
demic, many of these regulations and restrictions were lifted (Arslan, Drehmann, and Hofmann
2020). Table 6 shows the measures implemented by central banks, again drawing on the BIS Annual
Economic Report 2020. All the countries in the list cut their interest rate and provided liquidity facili-
ties for their financial systems. Other types of intervention varied from country to country.
It would seem, based on these results, that EMDEs had lax conditions to implement monetary
packages and alleviate the financial constraints on fiscal policy. However, as Aguilar and Cantu
(2020) show, the main explanatory variable for the conduct of monetary policy in EMDEs was



















Targeted transfersa       
Other labor income supportb       
Wage subsidies      
Tax cuts      
Tax deferral    
Measures supporting firms
Tax deferral        
Liquidity supportc        
Tax cuts      
Targeted transfers    
Source: BIS Annual Economic Report June 2020. aincludes cash and in kind-transfers to affected households; bincludes extended
unemployment and sick leave benefits; and cincludes non-budgetary measures, such as equity injections, asset purchases,
loans and debt assumptions or government guarantees and contingent liabilities.
Table 6. Selected central bank and prudential measures in EMDEs.
EMDEs
BR CH ID IN KR MX THþ ZA
Type of tool Measures
Interest rate Policy rate cut        
Lending/liquidity Gen. liquidity provisiona        
Specialised lending      
Asset purchases/sales Government bonds     
Commercial paper 
Corporate bonds  
Other private securitiesb
FX swap/intervention USD swap line   
FX intervention     
Prudential rules and regulations Capital requirements       
Liquidity requirements        
Payout restrictions       
Market functioningc        
Source: BIS Annual Economic Report June 2020 with þ being Thailand. Also, aincludes, for example, repo and reserve repo
operations, standing facilities, modified discount window and lower reserve requirement ratio. bincludes, for instance, asset
and mortgage-backed securities, covered bonds, and exchange-traded funds. cincludes, for example, short-selling bans and
circuit breakers.
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the eased financial conditions after the intervention of the Federal Reserve in international mar-
kets, providing global liquidity through different swaps agreements and facilities with numerous
EMDEs’ central banks. While central banks implemented liquidity programs one month after the
outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the exchange rate in these countries had a strong depreci-
atory trend. It was only after the Federal Reserve stepped in that financial conditions in EMDEs
eased and the exchange rate stabilized (Aguilar and Cantu 2020, 3–5). Then, central banks managed
to reduce long-term interest rates in EMDEs and support fiscal policy, either directly or indirectly.
In accordance with our model, the main anchor that helped to stabilize the impact on EMDEs was
the easing in global risk perceptions abided by the intervention of the Federal Reserve.
However, fiscal packages were much smaller in EMDEs as compared to high-income countries
(Alberola et al. 2020). Though many EMDEs show substantial increments in their public debt to
GDP ratio (Aguilar and Cantu 2020, 5), most of this evolution is explained by the fall in GDP
and the fall in tax revenues. Alberola et al. (2020) show that budgetary fiscal support in EMDEs
were, on average, a quarter of the amounts in high-income countries as percentage of GDP.
Funding measures (loans), in turn, represent a higher share of fiscal measures in EMDEs than in
advanced economies. Though many EMDEs implemented income transfers, the duration of these
measures is on average up to three months (Gentilini et al. 2020). However, a major characteristic
of cash transfer implementation in EMDEs during the COVID-19 pandemic was not only the
increase in measures, but also the increase in coverage. The rates of increase in coverage reached
8,684% in Myanmar (with new 21 million individuals included), 1,054% in Nigeria (9.3 million),
990% in the Congo Republic (0.4 million); 484% in Costa Rica (1.4 million). One can also men-
tion the cases of Bolivia (322% increment with new 11 million included), Egypt (312%, 18.5 mil-
lion), Colombia (285%, 13.2 million), Bangladesh (163%, 24.1 million) and Indonesia (111%, 83.2
million). Gentilini et al. (2020, 5) affirm that cash-based transfers have benefited 1.2 billion peo-
ple, while if we include increased coverage of already existing programs, administrative adaptation
measures and in-kind transfers, the number of beneficiaries rises to 1.7 billion. There were 179
new cash-transfer measures (58% of total cash transfer measures).
We can draw the following conclusions from of this summary, within the framework of the
model that we developed:
 The external situation of EMDEs stabilized only after the intervention of the Federal Reserve
through swap lines and liquidity provision. That ended the FX run that affected several
EMDEs, as well as the decline in commodity prices, which reverted with the recovery in
China and other Asian countries.
 With the stabilization of nominal ER, central banks in EMDEs provided widespread liquidity
support for their financial system, broad access to credit for the non-financial private sector,
and many implemented policies to curb the yields on domestic public debt, supporting the
implementation of fiscal policy.
 Fiscal policy packages in EMDEs were much reduced (as a percentage of GDP) than in
advanced economies. Countries with more restricted and expensive access to international
financial markets had the smallest programs, in accordance with the more restricted policy
regimes in our model.
 The heterogeneity in the labor force and the share of informal labor conditioned the type of fis-
cal support on EMDEs. The share of liquidity provisions to firms as percentage of total fiscal
measures was higher than in advanced economies. However, most EMDEs (and several LICs)
had to implement outright cash transfers and increase the coverage of social assistance programs
because of the large share of the population that was excluded from formal channels (firms,
banks, et cetera). A quarter of these measures, however, were implemented in a one-off time.
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Final Thoughts
The COVID-19 pandemic was a major shock to advanced and EMDEs, but its impacts differed
in both. When observing this from a BOPs angle, the main transmission channels came through
the sudden, fast, and unprecedented capital flight; the fall in commodity prices; the fall in global
demand; and the fall in remittances. This article developed a Keynesian open economy macroeco-
nomic model to analyze the feedbacks between these contemporaneous shocks.
We also provide a framework to understand the policy space in EMDEs. These countries had
significantly smaller fiscal packages in response to the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic. We
argue that their external situation provides one explanation for this difference. Capital flight had
a multiple impact through abrupt nominal ER depreciations, and stringent financing possibilities
in the context of institutional frameworks (i.e., cyclically balanced fiscal rules and inflation target-
ing monetary regime) that constrain the policy space of EMDEs. The lack of an international
lender of last resort that provides external finance adds to the institutional restrictions on the
involvement of central banks in countries that adopted these fiscal and monetary regimes frame-
works. EMDEs’ governments are, therefore, coerced into reducing stimulus packages and with-
draw this stimulus at the first sign of aggregate demand stabilization. Absent capital controls, the
availability of international reserves becomes then the ultimate liquidity fund to cushion the
external shock. Relief has to wait for external financial conditions to stabilize.
The intervention of the Federal Reserve in late March precisely proved this point. It provided
dollar liquidity to international investors and to several central banks in EMDEs, through cur-
rency swaps and repos. These eased uncertainty and risk concerns in peripheral economies.
Exchange rates stabilized and central banks in EMDEs were able to provide increased support to
their financial system and fiscal policy, through intervention in domestic debt market and also
through direct financing of government expenditure.
The COVID-19 pandemic shock called into question the restrictions on the intervention of
central banks in public debt markets in EMDEs. Fiscal and monetary coordination is back on the
table. The indispensable role of the central bank in stabilizing domestic financial markets requires
the lifting of the restrictions on “monetary financing” and participation in public debt markets.
Equally important is the design of a global mechanism that assures external finance in the direst
situations when uncertainty and tightened risk perceptions ripple through the BOPs of subordi-
nated and underdeveloped economies. Otherwise, external and domestic shocks will magnify and
intensify, producing large and lasting economic contractions. Several EMDEs and LICs face exter-
nal debt restrains, and an eventual second wave of COVID infections will require sustained exter-
nal support for coping with its impact.
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